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3 February 1944

3 February 1944


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3 February 1944

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Eastern Front

Soviet troops reenter Estonia.

Ten divisions of the German VIII army are surrounded by Soviet forces

Italy

Germans launch a night attack at Anzio



This Day in Hockey History – February 3, 1944 – Syd’s Six

Ten days after the Detroit Red Wings obliterated the New York Rangers 15-0, they set a few more records in a 12-2 victory on February 3, 1944. The two scores totaled 27 goals against the Rangers, which was an NHL record for goals against a specific team. However, the big news of the night was Syd Howe, who scored half of Detroit’s tallies. The Detroit Free Press hailed, “Goal glory unparalleled in hockey history came to Syd Howe Thursday night – and how!”

Howe (no relation to Gordie’s family) played center or left wing, even defense if need be. He began his NHL career with Ottawa in 1930. On February 11, 1935, he was traded to Detroit, where he helped win three Stanley Cup championships (including one in 1943), before his career ended in 1946.

The Olympia Stadium crowd of 8,147 gave a standing ovation after Howe’s performance in February 1944. The 32-year-old scored back-to-back goals in every period for a total of six in 38 minutes. In the first period, the goals came at 11:27 and 11:45. For the initial goal, he “cut in front and banged in a pass from Don Grosso,” and for the second, he had a “fifteen-foot shot off a rebound.” At the end of the second period, Howe scored at 17:52 and 18:54 with a “behind-the-net pass from Cully Simon” and then having stolen the puck, he “passed to Grosso and took a return pass.” Finally, at 8:17 and 9:14 of the third, Howe made good on passes from Grosso.

The record for most goals in one game had been set at seven by Joe Malone on January 31, 1920. Cy Denneny had scored six for the Ottawa Senators on February 7, 1921. As Howe later commented, “I had a good chance to break the all-time record but I couldn’t do it.” Still, since then, only two players have even managed six goals in a game – Red Berenson of the St. Louis Blues (November 7, 1968) and Darryl Sittler of the Toronto Maple Leafs (February 7, 1976).

Although the news focused on Howe’s achievement, the Detroit Free Press also pointed out a few other records set that same game. Thanks to Grosso having assisted on six goals and scoring one of his own, he matched two benchmarks. The assists tied Elmer Lach’s high from the previous winter, and the points tied the highs of Carl Liscombe and Max Bentley. A teammate of Howe and Grosso, Mud Bruneteau, scored his 26th goal of the season, giving him the Detroit franchise record for most goals in a season. Finally, the poor Rangers finally managed to score at 13:57 of the third period. This meant that they had gone 180 minutes and 29 seconds without scoring on Detroit, and that length of time gave the Red Wings an NHL record for longest time preventing a single team from scoring.


Leader of the Soviet Union from 1922 until his death in 1953, this collection contain Stalin's own writings, conversations, and legacy. The documents come mostly from the 1950s, and from Russian archives. Topics discussed include Stalin's economic opinions and his views on the situation in East Germany. The final items discuss Stalin's death and the fate of some of his ministers. See also Economic Cold War, and Post Stalin Succession Struggle. (Image, Stalin at the Tehran Conference, 1943)

Notes from the Meeting between Comrade Stalin and Economists Concerning Questions in Political Economy, 29 January 1941

Notes from L.A. Leont’ev's January 1941 meeting with Stalin, regarding drafts of two commissioned textbooks on political economy. Stalin gives his views on "planning", "wages", "fascism", and other issues.

Stalin’s Conversation with Choibalsan

Conversations between Joseph Stalin and Khorloogiin Choibalsan about Mongolia and efforts to defend against possible Chinese attacks during World War II.

Memorandum of Conversation Held in the Kremlin, February 2, 1944, at 6 p.m.

W. Averell Harriman and Joseph Stalin discuss the United States using Soviet Air Bases on the Pacific coast and the Soviets entering the Pacific fight.

Telegram re Stalin Harriman Conversation on Japanese Troops

W. Averell Harriman and Joseph Stalin discuss Soviet intelligence about Japanese troop movements.

Memorandum of Conversation re Stalin Harriman Coversation

A conversation between W. Averell Harriman and Joseph Stalin about the prospects of working with the Polish government during World War II.

Paraphrase of Outgoing Navy Cable - Moscow, February 3, 1944

W. Averell Harriman and Joseph Stalin discuss information the Russian have gathered from Japanese sources about future Japanese plans and troop movements during World War II.

Paraphrase of Embassy's Telegram No. 361, February 3, to the Department of State

Clark Kerr and Joseph Stalin discuss issues with the Polish government and the future of Poland after World War II.

Paraphrase of Embassy’s Telegram No. 673 of February 29, 1944, to the Department of State.

Ambassador Harriman's telegram about a conversation Joseph Stalin and Clark Kerr had about issues with the Polish government in London and the future of the Polish government post war.

Message Received from British Ambassador

Joseph Stalin and British Ambassador, Clark Kerr, discuss the future of the Polish government and Stalin's feeling about the Polish government in London.

Paraphrase of Embassy’s telegram No. 688, March 1, 1944, to the Department of State

W. Averell Harriman's telegram recounting Clark Kerr's summary of his conversation with Joseph Stalin discussing the future of the Polish govenment.

Paraphrase of Outgoing Navy Cable – Moscow, March 3, 1944.

Ambassador Harriman and Joseph Stalin discuss future military movements in the Far East and Soviet intelligence about Japanese military plans.

Stalin and Harriman Discuss Air Power and the Japanese

Ambassador Harriman and Joseph Stalin discuss Far East Air Power and intelligence about Japanese military movements.

Paraphrase of Embassy's telegram No. 716, March 3, 1944, to the Department of State

Joseph Stalin and Ambassador Harriman discuss Stalin's views on Poland.

Stalin’s conversation with Averell Harriman about the Polish Government

Ambassador Averell Harriman and Joseph Stalin discuss the questions concerning the future of the Polish government.

Stalin and Harriman Discuss Poland

Ambassador Harriman and Stalin discuss the "Polish Question".

Dinner Given by Marshal J.V. Stalin in Honour of the Command of the Polish Army

Joseph Stalin holds a dinner in honor of Polish troops with prominent members of the Polish and Soviet military as well as Soviet state officials.

Stalin Holds Dinner for Yugoslavian Leaders

Josip Tito, Milovan Djilas, and Joseph Stalin meet and dicuss currently events and theorize about post-war Europe.

Statement by Rev. Stanislaw Orlemanski at a Press Conference

Rev. Stanislaw Orlemanski holds a press conference to describe his trip to the Soviet Union and discuss the Polish question with Joseph Stalin.

Record of a Conversation between I. V. Stalin and the Roman Catholic Priest Stanislaus Orlemanski about the Feelings of the Polish Nationals in the United States toward the USSR

Stalin and Stanislaus Orlemanski, an American priest of Polish-American heritage, discuss America's perception of the Soviet Union, and the relationship between Poland and the Soviet Union.

Memorandum of Conversations with the Rev. Stanislaus Orlemanski at Springfield, Massachusetts

Dewitt C. Poole summarizes the trip Father Orlemanski to the Soviet Union and his conversations with Joseph Stalin.


This Day in WWII History: Feb 3, 1944: U.S. troops capture the Marshall Islands

On this day, American forces invade and take control of the Marshall Islands, long occupied by the Japanese and used by them as a base for military operations.

The Marshalls, east of the Caroline Islands in the western Pacific Ocean, had been in Japanese hands since World War I. Occupied by the Japanese in 1914, they were made part of the "Japanese Mandated Islands" as determined by the League of Nations. The Treaty of Versailles, which concluded the First World War, stipulated certain islands formerly controlled by Germany--including the Marshalls, the Carolines, and the Marianas (except Guam)--had to be ceded to the Japanese, though "overseen" by the League. But the Japanese withdrew from the League in 1933 and began transforming the Mandated Islands into military bases. Non-Japanese, including Christian missionaries, were kept from the islands as naval and air bases--meant to threaten shipping lanes between Australia and Hawaii--were constructed.

During the Second World War, these islands, as well as others in the vicinity, became targets of Allied attacks. The U.S. Central Pacific Campaign began with the Gilbert Islands, south of the Mandated Islands U.S. forces conquered the Gilberts in November 1943. Next on the agenda was Operation Flintlock, a plan to capture the Marshall Islands.

Adm. Raymond Spruance led the 5th Fleet from Pearl Harbor on January 22, 1944, to the Marshalls, with the goal of getting 53,000 assault troops ashore two islets: Roi and Namur. Meanwhile, using the Gilberts as an air base, American planes bombed the Japanese administrative and communications center for the Marshalls, which was located on Kwajalein, an atoll that was part of the Marshall cluster of atolls, islets, and reefs.


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19 FEBRUARY 1944 - BATTLE OF ENIWETOK ISLAND - World War II.
On 19 February 1944, the 106th Infantry and 104th Field Artillery of the 27th Infantry Division participated in the capture of Eniwetok Island, main island of the atoll of the same name, in the Marshall Islands, or Eastern Mandates.
After U.S. forces completed the capture of Kwajalein Atoll, Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill led a task force that included the V Amphibious Corps reserve in Operation CATCHPOLE to storm Eniwetok Atoll.
After serving as the floating reserve for the 22d Marines assault on Engebi Island on 18 February, the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 106th Infantry were to attack Eniwetok Island the next day. Since the @USMarines encountered only light resistance on Engebi, and Intelligence estimated Eniwetok was also lightly defended, Hill planned only a brief naval gunfire preparation in support. The preparatory fires inflicted little damage on the Japanese defenses. Although the assault waves faced moderate enemy fire, once ashore the terrain and heavier than expected Japanese resistance slowed the advance of the infantrymen and their supporting tracked landing vehicles (LVT) to a halt. The Japanese counterattacked, and the American soldiers repulsed their assaults with fierce hand-to-hand fighting. Hill then committed the 3d Battalion of the 22d Marines and a Marine tank company to reinforce the Army infantrymen, and with tactical fighter support, the island was finally secured on 21 February.
The remaining two battalions of the 22d Marines successfully attacked Parry Island on 22 February, with the support of the Army's 104th Field Artillery firing from Eniwetok.
# WWII75 # armyhistory
More Info: http://ow.ly/FQKg50lISS8

U.S. Army Center of Military History

21 - 22 JUNE 1942 - FORT STEVENS, OREGON ATTACKED BY JAPANESE SUBMARINE - # WWII
# Armyhistory # USArmy

In the middle of the night of 21-22 June 1942, Imperial Japanese submarine I-25 surfaced near the mouth of the Columbia River and opened fire on Fort Stevens, the U.S. Army Coast Artillery Corps installation on the Oregon coast. Fort Stevens was one of three forts that constituted the Harbor Defense of the Columbia in Washington and Oregon.

The men of the 18th and 249th Coast Artillery Regiments went to their action stations, and manned the 10-inch mortar, 10- and 6-inch gun and searchlight batteries, or took position with rifles and machine guns to repulse an enemy landing.

The attack did not last long as the submarine fired 17 rounds from its single 5.5-inch (140 mm) deck gun. Although the men quickly loaded and reported "ready to fire," the post commander ordered a blackout of all lights, including the searchlights, and for Battery Russell's 10-inch disappearing guns not to engage lest they reveal their positions.

The Japanese shelling did only minor damage to the installation and caused no casualties. As the Japanese vessel withdrew, an Army Air Forces A-29 Hudson bomber on a routine training patrol spotted the submarine still on the surface and attacked. None of its bombs struck the target before the submarine submerged and escaped.

U.S. Army Center of Military History

CHIEF'S HIGHLIGHTS - MODEL HUT - NATIONAL ARMY MUSEUM
This model hut in the Art of Soldiering Gallery, is a miniature replica of a Civil War Soldiers quarters made while he was recovering from battle injuries.

VIMEO.COM

Chief's Highlights 11 Model Hut.mp4

U.S. Army Center of Military History

In 1856, Assistant Surgeon (Captain) Albert J. Myer, a medical officer stationed in Texas, proposed that the Army adopt the visual communications system he developed and named "aerial telegraphy," but more commonly called "Wigwag." After successful demonstration and application, the Army approved Meyer's proposal on 21 June 1860 and named him the first - and only - signal officer, with the grade of major.

Meyer was ordered to recruit and train personnel from within the Army, who were then detailed to the Signal Corps, and gave him a modest budget for the procurement of equipment. While Meyer had recommended the establishment of a separate, trained professional military service, the Signal Corps did not constitute an official organization until 3 March 1863, along with Meyers' promotion to the rank of colonel. By the end of the Civil War, approximately 2,900 officers and men had served in the Signal Corps.

With the U.S. Army's field forces covering long distances and dispersed over wide areas, Myer saw the need for electrical telegraphy for field communications. He developed and introduced a field telegraph train, composed of a wagon-transported telegraph, along with its necessary support equipment. The train also included the soldiers who operated the devices, transmitting Morse code messages over wires strung on poles erected by other members of the corps.

The end of the Civil War did not bring an end to Signal Corps missions and responsibilities. Signal Corps soldiers continued to play a vital role in the Army's history, and introduced numerous innovations in military communications including aeronautics, aviation, radar, radio-telephone equipment, as well as land, wireless and satellite communication, to name a few.

The Army Signal Corps continues to develop, test, provide, and manage communications and information systems support for the command and control of combined arms forces.


Brief History Part 3 – Aug 1944 to Feb 1945

29th Flotilla moved to Felixstone under Commander in Chief Nore. Based at H.M.S. Beehive. Patrolling to protect Thames – Antwerp convoy route and northern convoy route from Thames as far as Greater Yarmouth, the MTB’s fighting off the mighty forays of E-boats and Midget submarines, and making frequent forays of their own against the Dutch harbours which the enemy forces were based. As always with coastal craft, the dark hours were for work, and the day for sleep.

November 1, 1944

Intelligence has reported much enemy shipping off the Hook of Holland and approximately 30 E-boats and R-boats at ljmuiden. The allies were to land and capture the shore batteries, and drive the enemy from the north side of the Scheldt as far as Antwerp Estuary.

This accomplished, the allies would be able to use Antwerp Harbour. That gallant, battle-scarred old body, the battleship H.M.S. Warspite, was to support the landing forces with her heavy 15″ guns. The 29th was instructed, at all costs, to stop any Eboats or R-boats proceeding southward.

The first division was comprised of M.T.B.’s 485 and 486 second Division, of M.T.B.’s 464,461 and 491. M.T.B. 461 was forced to drop out due to engine troubles. When the enemy was sighted, the 29th closed in for a torpedo attack. Suddenly, to the south of them, several E or R-boats were bearing down rapidly on a collision course.

This was one of the replacement boats. Note the maple leaf on the side of the bridge and the six-pounder on the foredeck. (PAC PA 116486)

M.T.B. 485 and 486 altered course to engage seven enemy boats in fierce action. lnspite of all guns blazing at them broadside, they ran down the long line of enemy boats. Then the convoy made up of several flak trawlers, one merchant ship of about 3,000 tons, a gun coaster, and a barge being towed by a tug, opened fire as well.

Meanwhile, M.T.B. 464 and 491 closed the merchant ship at 700 yards. As M.T.B. 491 fired two torpedoes, there was a terrific blinding flash, and a pall of ink-black smoke belched into the sky. Hit by gun fire, with the mess deck flooded, boat 464 was too low in the water to fire torpedoes. A second shell had instantly killed Able Seaman Harry Broadley and slightly wounded Able Seaman Allan Bevar. Petty Officer Motor Mechanic F.A. Walden took the initiative, and made a tingle’ against the hole with a large board, a large white turtleneck sweater, and a sawed-off boat hook. With these in place, 464 was seaworthy again, and the water could be pumped out of the mess deck.

M.T.B. 485 and 486 had given the seven E- and R-boats several good hits, and it looked like one of the enemy craft were on fire. In pursuit M.T.B.’s altered course towards the convoy, and went in for a torpedo attack, but unfortunately they were spotted and illuminated. Their attempt thwarted, they charged amid violent gun action, and 88 mm shells were soon bursting over the two boats, while green and yellow tracers rained down in torrents. They closed, trying to knock out one of the enemy escorts, but the flak was so violent and furious, that they had to disengage, having succeeded only in wounding their victim. However, the enemy convoy made a 180 degree turn and went back to their starting point, the Hook of Holland. The remainder of the night was spent with the M.T.B.’s exchanging gun fire with a German patrol of four flak trawlers known as the notorious Four Horsemen. It appears that both sides had been assigned to the same patrol position.

January, 1945

29th Flotilla transferred to Coastal Forces Immobile Unit No. One (CFMIU) at Ostend.

February 1945, The Disaster at Ostend

After the disaster at Ostend. (PAC PA 116484)

On the afternoon of February 14, 1945 several of the flotillas, including the 29th, were berthed inside Ostend harbour in a narrow passage known as The Crique. A patrol was scheduled for that night, and men not on watch had been given a “Make and Mend”, or afternoon off.

Many of them were sleeping below decks. Others had taken advantage of the opportunity to go ashore. Suddenly a sheet of fire was seen running along the water toward the jefties. Defuelling had been carried on earlier in the day, and in some way the highly volatile gasoline that had been discharged onto the surface had become ignited. Before an alarm could be given the flames had licked in about the close ranked boats, and many of them were infernos above and below decks, shrouded in oily smoke and surrounded by blazing gasoline. Some men on the decks dove overboard into the fiery waters and swam beneath the surface to safety. Others never got up from below. Still others were killed by flying debris as they emerged from the hatches. Explosions began to rip craft after craft wide open, showering the flaming wreckage farther along the line. A pall of smoke towered along the waterfront and out of it, for two terrible hours, came the roar of bursting fuel tanks, the missiles of exploding ammunition, and the cries of men.

After the disaster at Ostend. (PAC PA 116485)

Three boats of the 29th were saved by men who first fought down the flames in one, and then brought their craft alongside two more to tow them out of the harbour. At the end of the day the 29th Flotilla had ceased to exist. Five of its original eight boats had been destroyed M.T.B.’s 464,485,486 and 491 which were the only ones to be saved had augmented the Flotilla. Seven British boats had been lost and many more damaged. Twenty-eight Canadians and thirty-five British sailors had been killed.

The remaining boats of the Flotilla were turned over to strengthen Royal Navy flotillas.


Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 05 Apr 2021, 21:41

Does raise the question, if the Allied strategy in 1943-44 is to remain on the strategic defensive in Italy, does the 2nd NZ go back to the Pacific?

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 05 Apr 2021, 21:44

To be born in mind if sacrificing operations in Italy for an earlier Anvil/Dragoon

c.4th June 1944
"Kesselring had lost the men of about four divisions, the artillery of five divisions, and the armour of about two panzer regiments. Moreover, very happily for the Allies' purpose of containing German forces in Italy and of drawing into Italy forces which might have been used to oppose 'Overlord', Hitler decided to reinforce the Italian campaign. Between the middle of May and the end of the first week in June four infantry divisions were ordered to Italy from other countries, as well as the equivalent of the infantry of three divisions if we reckon two three-battalion regiments to a division. In addition Kesselring committed two divisions from the Adriatic front and brought down three from northern Italy."
TMAME Vol. VI

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Aber » 06 Apr 2021, 15:36

An earlier Overlord, because of better shipping serviceability rates or less vessels tied up in the Med?

Coastal defences are weaker, defenders are less well trained, and FAAA can launch operation in August weather and daylight rather than September. Might just get them across the Rhine.

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Juan G. C. » 06 Apr 2021, 16:09

An earlier Overlord, because of better shipping serviceability rates or less vessels tied up in the Med?

Coastal defences are weaker, defenders are less well trained, and FAAA can launch operation in August weather and daylight rather than September. Might just get them across the Rhine.

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Juan G. C. » 06 Apr 2021, 17:40

The most interesting aspect of all this is that the NEPTUNE landing ships and craft serviceability estimates were actually much lower than what was experienced. In fact, overall serviceability was around 98%, rather than the 80%-90% ranges COSSAC and later planning used. In the end, many of the assault convoys, especially on the British beaches, were able to take advantage of additional LCT loading, without having to overload the LCT. They may be found with LTIN where an "a" is appended.

So if the planners in February were perfectly prescient - I know, its a "what if", so of course they were - and had known what the actual serviceability rates and production and deployments of new ships and craft would be, then of course NEPTUNE and ANVIL probably could have been executed simultaneously.

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Richard Anderson » 06 Apr 2021, 18:28

Well, sure. U.S. Naval forces were 99.3% operational on D-Day, compared to 97.6% for home-based British forces. For purposes of planning, ANCXF had estimated that 90% LST and 85% LCI(L) and LCT would be operational on D-Day. The organization that accomplished that, COREP (Coordination of Repairs), which coordinated the activities of all agencies, civilian as well as naval, engaged in repair and upkeep of vessels, was not established until February.

Here's another problem, where and when are all the ships and craft in February? For example, of those units assigned to UTAH, LST FLOT 10 was still working up, not departing the US for the UK until 4 February and not arriving at Milford Haven with its 13 LST until 1304 2 March 1944. LCI (L) Flot 11 and its 22 LCI (L) was also underway to the UK during February. The 15 LCI (L) of FLOT 2 were at Naples in February.

Overall, as of the assumption of command by Admiral Hall of the 11th PHIBFOR on 27 November 1943, there were 235 USN landing ships and craft in England. By 1 June 1944, there were 2,458.

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by maltesefalcon » 06 Apr 2021, 23:46

One factor I'd like to reflect on.

IRL Overlord was somewhat of a surprise attack. Partly due to extensive planning. Partly due to elaborate deception. Also due to the relatively short travel distance/time.

Anvil would require a much longer transit time. There was a much greater risk of discovery on the route. If the Germans got any inkling that this force was synchronized with a cross channel invasion, they would be able to raise the alarm.

Of course the Anvil invasion went ahead as planned IRL. What I would like to discuss is how much of a distraction the June 6 event was to potential air and naval patrols along the southern and west coast of France. Perhaps doing them in a delayed fashion actually worked in the Allies favour?

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Kingfish » 07 Apr 2021, 01:26

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 07 Apr 2021, 02:49

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 07 Apr 2021, 02:57

One factor I'd like to reflect on.

IRL Overlord was somewhat of a surprise attack. Partly due to extensive planning. Partly due to elaborate deception. Also due to the relatively short travel distance/time.

At the strategic level it was no surprise. Everyone was expecting it in May, or June at the latest. Large reinforcements had been made, at the expense of the eastern & Italian fronts. A large fortification project had been underway since December. The coastal defenses better organized. ect.. ect.

At the tactical level the arrival of the airborne forces from 01:30 & on caused the entire 7th Army to go on alert. By 05:00 everyone who counted was at their battle position, From the 84th Corps commander Marcks down to Severloh & Glockel at their MG overlooking the beach. Yes it was shocking to see the hundreds of ships at sunrise, but it not was like the 7th Army or 84th Corps were just turning out to shave and stand roll call at 05:00

Operationally things were a bit more discombobulated, theres some argument suprise had its effects there. I'll leave those to others.

As in the Channel German reconnaissance was pretty much a dead letter. Early morning of 6th June one patrol boat out of LeHavre stumbled into the Brit side of it. They apparently were unable to get a radio message through. A utility boat servicing navigation bouys in the Bai du Seine had a similar experience. Radio jamming probably silenced them. Air recon seems to have been shut down over the Channel & southern UK in May. It was much the same along the southern French and Italian littorals. Aggressive Allied naval and air activity reduced the German reconissance significantly. Maybe they could get some useful information, but the actual track record is poor.

VLR patrols were still going out over the Atlantic in reduced numbers. Reporting traffic in the Atlantic.


Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by rcocean » 10 May 2021, 17:04

All this was going to happen anyway. German troops in Southern France would've retreated back to Germany, in any case, otherwise, Patton's 3rd Army would've cut them off. The Germans would've left troops in Toulon and Marseilles and fought to keep those ports out of American hands, but eventually they would've fallen just like Brest did. And after the occupation of the Po Valley, the French Corps would've been transferred To France. So, its just a matter of timing. By destroying the Germans in Italy in July/August 1944, we would've been in a better position in Nov/Dec 1944. Marseilles would've been open by then, and we could have transferred large numbers of Troops to France, since there was no war in Italy. There was a reason why Alanbrook, Alexander, and others were opposed to Dragoon. It wasn't just some blind spot, they had good military reasons.

And you can talk about how important Marseilles was before Antwerp was opened, but so what? All the offensives south of the Ardennes Before Feb 1945 , didn't accomplish anything decisive. Patton and Devers pushed the Germans back to the Siegfried line and the upper Rhine.

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 10 May 2021, 23:44

All this was going to happen anyway. German troops in Southern France would've retreated back to Germany, in any case, otherwise, Patton's 3rd Army would've cut them off.

Im skeptical Patton could have cut much off. The first week of September the entire 12th Army group had 14 divisions west of Paris, all south of the Oise river & north of Troyers. Four more were scattered about the Breton peninsula besieging ports. From the Oise to the Swiss border is apporx 300 km/ At 11 km defense front for a US infantry division thats 28 divisions required. Of course Bradleys AG must cover its rear towards Army Group G to the SE, so even at a defense front of 22 km its 'difficult' (sarcasm alert). Then there is the problem of extending the US advance/supply the 225 south to the Swiss border. 12 AG was still embroiled in problems of transport of fuel and ammunition. The advance they accomplished to the Meuse river & Nancy was sustained by leaving behind substantial corps and army combat support. In other words the 12th AG forward element lacked the combat support the US Army depended on.

Lacking a 6th AG invading from the south the elements of Army Group G are intact, and they have a alternate route to northern Italy. Unless one proposes Alexanders armies bounce over the Appines & overrun the Po region in A few weeks of August and September.

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by rcocean » 11 May 2021, 01:31

Having Alexander's armies go into Po Valley and destroy the German Armies in August was exactly the point of Alanbrooke's strategy of not doing Dragoon, and either landing at Trieste, or doing no landing at all. Given that the Allies nearly broke through WITHOUT the French corps or several veteran US Division (36, 45, etc.) its hard to see how the Germans would've stopped them.

No doubt cancelling Dragoon would've severely hampered 3rd army ability to drive straight into Germany via Metz and the area south of the Ardennes in September and the fall of 1944. . But then what did Patton accomplish with Marseilles open and the 6th army group on his flank? Little more than capturing Metz and pushing the Germans back to the Siegfried line. Montgomery made the point that the key area was North of the Ardennes where we could capture the Ruhr. Its hard to see what Dragoon accomplished. Its nice we got Marseilles so soon, but we still couldn't drive into Germany till Feb/March 1945. Again, the whole point is not should we have taken Marseilles, its when and how.


Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 05 Apr 2021, 21:41

Does raise the question, if the Allied strategy in 1943-44 is to remain on the strategic defensive in Italy, does the 2nd NZ go back to the Pacific?

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 05 Apr 2021, 21:44

To be born in mind if sacrificing operations in Italy for an earlier Anvil/Dragoon

c.4th June 1944
"Kesselring had lost the men of about four divisions, the artillery of five divisions, and the armour of about two panzer regiments. Moreover, very happily for the Allies' purpose of containing German forces in Italy and of drawing into Italy forces which might have been used to oppose 'Overlord', Hitler decided to reinforce the Italian campaign. Between the middle of May and the end of the first week in June four infantry divisions were ordered to Italy from other countries, as well as the equivalent of the infantry of three divisions if we reckon two three-battalion regiments to a division. In addition Kesselring committed two divisions from the Adriatic front and brought down three from northern Italy."
TMAME Vol. VI

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Aber » 06 Apr 2021, 15:36

An earlier Overlord, because of better shipping serviceability rates or less vessels tied up in the Med?

Coastal defences are weaker, defenders are less well trained, and FAAA can launch operation in August weather and daylight rather than September. Might just get them across the Rhine.

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Juan G. C. » 06 Apr 2021, 16:09

An earlier Overlord, because of better shipping serviceability rates or less vessels tied up in the Med?

Coastal defences are weaker, defenders are less well trained, and FAAA can launch operation in August weather and daylight rather than September. Might just get them across the Rhine.

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Juan G. C. » 06 Apr 2021, 17:40

The most interesting aspect of all this is that the NEPTUNE landing ships and craft serviceability estimates were actually much lower than what was experienced. In fact, overall serviceability was around 98%, rather than the 80%-90% ranges COSSAC and later planning used. In the end, many of the assault convoys, especially on the British beaches, were able to take advantage of additional LCT loading, without having to overload the LCT. They may be found with LTIN where an "a" is appended.

So if the planners in February were perfectly prescient - I know, its a "what if", so of course they were - and had known what the actual serviceability rates and production and deployments of new ships and craft would be, then of course NEPTUNE and ANVIL probably could have been executed simultaneously.

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Richard Anderson » 06 Apr 2021, 18:28

Well, sure. U.S. Naval forces were 99.3% operational on D-Day, compared to 97.6% for home-based British forces. For purposes of planning, ANCXF had estimated that 90% LST and 85% LCI(L) and LCT would be operational on D-Day. The organization that accomplished that, COREP (Coordination of Repairs), which coordinated the activities of all agencies, civilian as well as naval, engaged in repair and upkeep of vessels, was not established until February.

Here's another problem, where and when are all the ships and craft in February? For example, of those units assigned to UTAH, LST FLOT 10 was still working up, not departing the US for the UK until 4 February and not arriving at Milford Haven with its 13 LST until 1304 2 March 1944. LCI (L) Flot 11 and its 22 LCI (L) was also underway to the UK during February. The 15 LCI (L) of FLOT 2 were at Naples in February.

Overall, as of the assumption of command by Admiral Hall of the 11th PHIBFOR on 27 November 1943, there were 235 USN landing ships and craft in England. By 1 June 1944, there were 2,458.

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by maltesefalcon » 06 Apr 2021, 23:46

One factor I'd like to reflect on.

IRL Overlord was somewhat of a surprise attack. Partly due to extensive planning. Partly due to elaborate deception. Also due to the relatively short travel distance/time.

Anvil would require a much longer transit time. There was a much greater risk of discovery on the route. If the Germans got any inkling that this force was synchronized with a cross channel invasion, they would be able to raise the alarm.

Of course the Anvil invasion went ahead as planned IRL. What I would like to discuss is how much of a distraction the June 6 event was to potential air and naval patrols along the southern and west coast of France. Perhaps doing them in a delayed fashion actually worked in the Allies favour?

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Kingfish » 07 Apr 2021, 01:26

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 07 Apr 2021, 02:49

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 07 Apr 2021, 02:57

One factor I'd like to reflect on.

IRL Overlord was somewhat of a surprise attack. Partly due to extensive planning. Partly due to elaborate deception. Also due to the relatively short travel distance/time.

At the strategic level it was no surprise. Everyone was expecting it in May, or June at the latest. Large reinforcements had been made, at the expense of the eastern & Italian fronts. A large fortification project had been underway since December. The coastal defenses better organized. ect.. ect.

At the tactical level the arrival of the airborne forces from 01:30 & on caused the entire 7th Army to go on alert. By 05:00 everyone who counted was at their battle position, From the 84th Corps commander Marcks down to Severloh & Glockel at their MG overlooking the beach. Yes it was shocking to see the hundreds of ships at sunrise, but it not was like the 7th Army or 84th Corps were just turning out to shave and stand roll call at 05:00

Operationally things were a bit more discombobulated, theres some argument suprise had its effects there. I'll leave those to others.

As in the Channel German reconnaissance was pretty much a dead letter. Early morning of 6th June one patrol boat out of LeHavre stumbled into the Brit side of it. They apparently were unable to get a radio message through. A utility boat servicing navigation bouys in the Bai du Seine had a similar experience. Radio jamming probably silenced them. Air recon seems to have been shut down over the Channel & southern UK in May. It was much the same along the southern French and Italian littorals. Aggressive Allied naval and air activity reduced the German reconissance significantly. Maybe they could get some useful information, but the actual track record is poor.

VLR patrols were still going out over the Atlantic in reduced numbers. Reporting traffic in the Atlantic.


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